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NATURE OF THE CASE 
The portion of the lawsuit on appeal concerns Cross-
Claims between Crossclaimant-Appellant Reid Swapp ("Swapp") an~, 
Crossclaimant-Respondent Tanglewood SLC Associates, Ltd. 
("Tanglewood"), arising out of construction work performed by 
Swapp on property owned by Tanglewood. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
As a result of the failure of Swapp to respond to 
discovery requests made by Tanglewood and to comply with an 
Order compel ling Swapp to respond to such discovery requests, 
on July 1, 1981, Judge James S. Sawaya entered an Order strik-
ing the Cross-Claim of Swapp against Tanglewood, and striking 
the Answer of Swapp to the Cross-Claim of Tanglewood. Further, 
on July 1, 1981, after strking the pleadings of Swapp, Judge 
Sawaya entered Judgment in favor of Tanglewood and Joseph M. 
Friedheim ("Friedheim") against Swapp, as requested in the 
Cross-Claim of Tanglewood and Friedheim. 
Thereafter, on October 9, 1981, Swapp moved the 
Court to set aside the Judgment, and a hearing on the Motion 
was held on October 19, 1981, before Judge G. Hal Taylor. On 
October 26, 1981, Judge Taylor entered an Order denying the 
Motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Tanglewood seeks affirmance of the Order of Judge 
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Taylor denying the Motion of Swapp to set aside the Judgment 
entered against Swapp. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 10, 1980, plaintiff Gardiner & Gardiner 
Builders, a Utah corporation, filed a Complaint against defen-
dants Swapp, Tanglewood, Friedheim and others seeking to re-
cover sums for work performed on property owned by Tanglewood 
and to foreclose a lien for said sum. (Record ("R."), p. 2) • 
Answers to the Complaint were duly filed by the defendants. 
Swapp filed a Cross-Claim against Tanglewood (R., p. 46) and 
Tanglewood and Friedheim filed a Cross-Claim against Swapp. 
(R. , p. 141) • In the Cross-Claim of Swapp, he sought to re-
cover sums for work he performed and to foreclose a lien for 
said sum. In the Cross-Claim of Tanglewood and Friedheim, they 
sought to have the lien of Swapp declared void and to recover 
from Swapp sums paid to Swapp for work which was not performed 
or performed inadequately. Answers to the Cross-Claims were 
filed by the respective parties. (R., p. 97 and 175). 
On or about May 8, 1981, Tanglewood served on Swapp 
Interrogatories (R., p. 207) and Request for Production of Doc-
uments (R., p. 204). On May 29, 1981, Tanglewood served on 
Swapp a Notice of Deposition scheduling the deposition of Swapp 
for June 12, 1981. (R., p. 230). On June 11, 1981, Swapp and 
Tanglewood, through their respective attorneys, entered into a 
-2-
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Stipulation and Motion to Extend Discovery Period (R., p. 247), 
which provided that Swapp would respond to said Interrogatories 
and Request_. for Production of Documents by June 17, 1981, and 
the deposition of Swapp was continued to June 30, 1981. An 
Order was entered on said Stipulation and Motion by Judge 
Sawaya on June 11, 1981. 
On June 19, 1981, Tanglewood filed a Motion to Com-
pel Swapp to respond to the Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents, as required by the Order entered by 
Judge Sawaya on June 11, 1981. A hearing was scheduled for 
June 25, 1981 on said Motion to Compel. (R., p. 254). The 
Motion to Compel was granted and an Order was entered (R., p. 
267), which provided additional time for Swapp to respond to 
the discovery requests. The Order further provided that the 
pleadings of Swapp would be stricken if Swapp failed to comply 
with the Order. 
Swapp failed to comply with the Order, and on June 
30, 1981, Tanglewood and Friedheim filed a Motion to Strike the 
pleadings of Swapp. (R., p. 276). On June 1, 1981, Judge 
Sawaya entered an Order striking the pleadings of Swapp (R., p. 
272), and a Default Certificate and Judgment were then en-
tered. (R., p. 271 and 279). 
On July 9, a Motion for Supplemental Order was made 
(R., p. 283), and on July 10, 1981, a Supplemental Order was 
-3-
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issued. (R., p. 288). There is no indication in the Record if 
such Order was served. However, a second Supplemental Order 
was issued _Augu·st 12, 1981. (R., p. 290). According to the 
Return, the Motion and Supplemental Order were served at the 
home of Swapp on September 3, 1981. (R., p. 292). Swapp 
failed to appear at the hearing on the Supplemental Order (R., 
p. 293), and an Order to Show Cause was issued and served per-
sonally on Swapp on September 22, 1981. (R., p. 296). The 
hearing on the Order to Show Cause was held October 2, 1981, 
and Swapp personally appeared. (R., p. 297). 
On October 9, 1981, the Motion to Set Aside the 
Judgment and supporting documents were prepared, and were filed 
with the Court on October 13, 1981. (R. , p. 298-311) • The 
hearing on the Motion was scheduled and held on October 19, 
1981. (R., p. 310). After argument, Judge Taylor entered an 
Order denying the Motion to Set Asi.de the Judgment. (R., p. 
313). 
In the Brief of Swapp, it is stated that Swapp first 
became aware of the Judgment on October 1, 1981, when an Execu-
tion was served. (Swapp Brief, p. 5). As noted above, Swapp 
was served with a Supplemental Motion and Order on September 3, 
1981, and the Supplemental Motion specifically states that a 
Judgment was entered against Swapp. (R., p. 283). Further, an 
Order to Show Cause was issued and served on Swapp on September 
-4-
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22, 1981. (R., p. 294-296). It is also noted that the Execu-
tion (R., p. 321), according to the Return, was served on Swapp 
on September 22-, 1981. (See the back side of page 322 of the 
Record). 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD DEFER 'TO THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISION DENYING SWAPP'S MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held repeatedly that a 
trial court's decision on a motion to set aside a default judg-
ment should be afforded great deference, and should only be 
reversed when an abuse of discretion is clearly shown. 
The trial court is endowed with consider-
able latitude of discretion in granting or 
denying a motion to relieve a party from a 
final judgment under Rule 60{b){l), 
U.R.C.P., and this court will reverse the 
trial court only where an abuse of this 
discretion is clearly established. • • • 
[T]his court will not reverse the determi-
nation of the trial court merely because 
the motion could have been granted. 
Airkem Intermountain Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P. 2d 
429, 431 (1973). Accord, Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (Utah 
1979); Central Finance Co. v. Kynaston, 22 Utah 2d 284, 452 
P.2d 316 (1969); and Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 
2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962). 
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POINT II: 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED SWAPP' S 
MOTION BECAUSE, UNDER UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 60(b) IT WAS NOT TIMELY. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that: 
Upon motion and upon such terms as are just the 
court may in the furtherance of justice, relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final 
Judgment, Order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; • • • or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judg-
ment. The motion shall be made within a reason-
able time, and for reasons (1), (2), (3)J or (4), 
not more than three months after the ud ment, 
Order, or proceed ng was entere • Emp as1s 
added). 
Swapp moved to set aside the default judgment more 
than three months after judgment was entered against him, al-
though he knew of the Judgment within said three month period. 
Nonetheless, he now argues that his Motion was not time barred 
under Rule 60(b). The substance of his argument is that his 
motion falls into the category of Rule 60(b) (7), rather than 
60{b)(l), and that the three month limit does not apply under 
Rule 60(b) (7). In other words, to avoid the time limitations 
of 60(b) (1), Swapp argues that the grounds for setting aside 
the default against him do not involve "mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect" (60(b) (1)), but rather "any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judg-
ment" (60(b) (7)). This B.rgument is without foundation based 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
upon the facts of this case. 
The only justifications Swapp assets for relieving him 
from the d~_fault judgment is that he should be excused for his 
original attorney's neglect. As set out in Point III below, 
the neglect of an attorney is imputed to the client, and ac-
cordingly, the arguments of Swapp fall squarely in 60(b) (1). 
However, Swapp seeks to obscure this rule of law by stressing 
the magnitude of his original attorney's alleged negligence. 
Regardless of the degree of negligence, however, the argument 
is still covered by 60(b)(l) and the time limitations applica-
ble thereto. Swapp is merely trying to use 60(b)(7) to circum-
vent the three month time limit that applies to motions under 
60(b)(l). 
The Utah Supreme Court has rejected a similar attempt 
to circumvent Rule 60(b)(l) in Pitts v. Mclachlan, 567 P.2d 171 
(Utah 1977). Other cases have similarly held that the residual 
provisions of 60(b) (7) cannot be used to circumvent the time 
limitations under Rule 60(b)(l), and the provisions of subparts 
(1) and (7) are mutually exclusive. Goland v. Central Intelli-
gence Agency, 607 F.2d 339, 372-73 (D.C. Cir., 1978), and 
Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 699, 701-02 (2d 
Cir., 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1029. Also see, Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil, § 2864, p~ 217. 
Since 60(b)(7) is a catch-all provision it could encompass any 
-7-
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argument that would be more aptly categorized under 60{b) (1), 
(2), (3) or (4). If Swapp's negligence argument can be subject 
to the indefinite time limit applicable to motions under 
60(b) (7), then so can a.ny other claim that would be more at 
home in a different category. This result would destroy the 
purpose and certainty of a definite three month time limit. 
Even if Swapp is correct that Rule 60(b) (7) is the 
proper basis for its motion to set aside the default judgment, 
Rule 60(b), whether under subpart (1) or (7), still requires 
that the motion he brought "within a reasonable time." Swapp 
failed to do even this. In the Brief of Swapp, it is stated at 
page 5 that he first learned of the Judgment on October 1, 
1981. However, at page 15 of the Brief, it is stated Swapp 
learned of the Judgment on September 20, 1981. According to 
the Record, Swapp should have learned of the Judgment on Sep-
tember 3, 1981, when Swapp was served with a Supplemental Or-
der. In any event, the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment was 
not prepared until October 9, 1981. The delay in bringing the 
Motion hardly shows prompt attention to the matter on the part 
of Swapp. Under the circumstances of this case, Judge Taylor 
found that Swapp did not bring the Motion within a reasonable 
time, and this Court should uphold the finding of Judge Taylor, 
whether the Motion was under Rule 60(b)(l) or 60(b)(7). 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III: 
EVEN HAD IT BEEN TIMELY, SWAPP'S MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT WOULD HAVE BEEN 
WITHOUT MERIT BECAUSE SWAPP MUST BE HELD 
RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS ATTORNEY'S NEGLECT AND 
BECAUSE SWAPP WAS GUILTY OF NEGLECT HIM-
SELF. 
Swapp makes no claim in this case that his attorney 
was not guilty of neglect or that his attorney's neglect was 
excusable. Swapp cannot therefore prevail on a motion under 
Rule 60(b) if this Court ascribes his attorney's conduct to him. 
In general, a client is held responsible for his at-
torney's negligence and cannot use such negligence as an excuse 
to escape a default judgment. The Supreme Court of Nevada 
stated this rule recently in Tahoe Village Realty v. Desmet, 
590 P.2d 1158 (Nev. 1979). There, defendants' attorney with-
drew from the case without ever filing an answer and without 
informing defendants of his withdrawal. Approximately a month 
after defendants' attorney withdrew, a default judgment was 
entered in favor of plaintiffs. Defendants appealed the trial 
court's denial of their motion to set aside the default judg-
ment. The Nevada Supreme Court stated: 
Appellants only remaining argument is that 
their attorneys nonfeasance should not be 
imputed to them. We have previously con-
sidered and resolved this issue: 'It is a 
general rule that the negligence of an at-
torney is imputable to his client and that 
the latter cannot be relieved from a judg-
ment taken against him in consequence of the 
neglect, carelessness, forgetfulness, or 
-9-
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attention of the former.' Guardia v. 
Guardia, 48 Nev. 230, 233-234, 229 P. 386, 
387 (1924). Tahoe Village Realty v. Desmet, 
590 P.2d at 1161. 
Similarly, in Southern Bonding Co. v. Teel, 550 P.2d, 
571 (Okl. 1976), an attorney failed to file an answer for more 
than year while assuring his client that the "matter was being 
taken care of." Id. at 574. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
held that: "[a]n attorney's negligence while representing a 
client is imputable to client as client's negligence and does 
not constitute 'unavoidable casulty and misfortune' justifying 
vacation of judgment under statute." Id. at 575. The Supreme 
Court sustained the trial court's rejection of the motion to 
vacate the default. 
The federal courts follow a similar rule in applying 
the provisions of rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure: "Appellant • • • claims that the judgment should have 
been set aside under rule 60(b)(l) for 'mistakes, inadvertence, 
surprise or excusable neglect' because he did not personally 
consent to his attorney's failure to appear. We find his con-
tention to be wholly frivolous." Nederlandsche Handel-Maat 
Shappij v. Jay Emm, Inc., 301 F.2d 114, 115 (2nd Cir. 1962). 
See Williams v. Five Platters, Inc., 510 F.2d 963 (C.C.P.A. 
1975). 
The holdings of the Utah Supreme Court have been 
consistent with the rule that the Oklahoma and Nevada Supreme 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Courts articulated in Tahoe Village Realty and Southern Bonding 
Co. The Utah case that is most closely analogous to the situa-
tion this _.appeal presents is Airkem Intermountain, Inc· v. 
Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973). Defendant in 
Airkem appealed the rejection of his motion to set aside a 
default, pleading that his attorney failed to appear for trial 
after attempting unsuccessfully to reach him and inform him of 
the trial date ten days prior to trial. He explained his at-
torney's failure to reach him by stating that he was away at 
work from 7:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. and that he visited his termi-
nally ill wife at the hospital during the evenings. The Su-
preme Court sustained the trial court's refusal to set aside 
the default. 
The Supreme Court found that the decision of the 
trial court was defensible on two grounds. First, the defen-
dant may have been negligent in failing to maintain - contact 
with his attorney. Second, the attorney may have been negli-
gent in his belated attempt to reach his client. In endorsing 
this second ground, the Supreme Court recognized that an 
attorney's negligence is properly charged to the client in con-
sidering whether to uphold a default judgment. 
Under the rule of Tahoe Village Realty, Southern 
Bonding Co., and Airkem, there can be no basis for overruling 
the trial court and setting aside the default in this case. 
-11-
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Swapp's attorney inexcusably neglected to file papers that had 
to be filed to avoid default. This was exactly the situation 
in both Tahoe Village Realty and Southern Bonding Co. 
Swapp argues that negligence is different from aban-
donment and that his attorney abandoned him. Whenever an at-
torney neglects a case to the point of default, however, this 
argument can be made with equal force. If this court adopts 
Swapp's abandonment theory, no default will be secure and delay 
and default will be without an effective deterrent. 
Even if Swapp is not held responsible for his attor-
ney's negligence, the trial court's decision upholding the 
default should stand. Like the defendant in Airkem, Swapp was 
negligent in failing to maintain contact with his attorney to 
ascertain whether his interests were being guarded. The reci-
tation of facts in Swapp' s own brief on this appeal makes no 
reference to any communciation between Swapp and his attorney 
in the year and a half between the time Swapp filed his answer 
and the time the default judgment was entered. By itself, this 
should be enough to support the trial court's decision. 
The only Utah case Swapp cites to support his posi-
tion is Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Development Corp., 
611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), which is completely irrelevant to 
this situation. In Inters-tate Excavating, the defendant's 
attorney withdrew from the case with court approval and sent 
-12-
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notice to his client. The client failed to get a new attorney 
and appear at trial. The trial court entered a default judg-
ment again~t him. Defendant moved to have the default set 
aside on the ground that he had never received notice of his 
attorney's withdrawal. He speculated that the notice might 
have been lost in his office in a large packet of mail from the 
same attorney. The trial court denied the motion to set aside 
the default. The Supreme Court reversed holding that defen-
dant's failure to appear was the result of excusable negligect 
in misplacing the notice of his attorney's withdrawal. 
There was no question in Interstate Excavating about 
the propriety of the behavior of defendant's original attor-
ney. The court merely held that defenant was not inexcusably 
negligent in misplacing the notice of his attorney's with-
drawal. It did not hold that a client can escape the conse-
quences of inexcusable neglect by blaming his attorney. 
There is also an obvious practical distinction be-
tween Interstate Excavating and this case. If the Supreme 
Court had let the default stand in Interstate Excavating, the 
defendant would have been liable for the amount of the judgment 
without any hope of indemnification for that amount. Unlike 
the original attorney in Interstate Excavating, however, 
Swapp' s original attorney was negligent in handling his case. 
Thus Swapp has a cause of action for malpractice against his 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
original attorney which may shift the burden of the default 
judgment. 
·The cases from other jurisdictions that Swapp cites 
to support of his position in this appeal do not serve that 
purpose any better than Interstate Excavating. In Stafford v. 
Dickson, 46 Haw. 52, 374 P.2d 665 (1962), which Swapp relies 
on, the attorney in that case properly withdrew and notice 
somehow failed to reach his client. This resulted in a de-
fault. The holding in Stafford is almost identical to the 
holding in Interstate Excavating and is just as irrelevant to 
this case. 
Swapp also relies on Rogers v. Sheppard, 192 P.2d 
643 (Okl. 1948). Swapp's reliance could not be more mis-
placed. In the Rogers case, an attorney suffered a heart 
attack, and he was unable to attend to his business which re-
sulted in a default. The Oklahoma statute permitted vacation 
of default judgments that resulted from "unavoidable casulty or 
misfortune." Id. at 645. The court held: 
The failure of counsel to prosecute or de-
fend a cause through no fault of the attor-
ney or client, resulting in a default judg-
ment being rendered against the client 
constitutes • • • unavoidable casulty or 
misfortune. In 49 C.J.S. Judgments, §280, 
the rule applicable here is stated as fol-
lows: "The illness of party's counsel so 
severe as to prevent him from appearing in 
trying the case :f.s good ground for vacating 
the judgment, provided such party did not 
know that in time to retain other counsel or 
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was prevented in some other way fron doing 
so. Id. at 645-46. (Emphasis added). 
This holding has nothing to do with Swapp who is trying to 
escape the ·consequences of his attorney's inexcusable neglect· 
Swapp leans heavily on Buckert v. Briggs, 15 Cal. App. 
3rd 296, 93 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971). Buckert stands for the prop-
osition that where an attorney goes beyond negligence and acts 
in such a way as to negate the attorney-client relationship, 
the general rule that the client is chargable with his attor-
ney's negligence should not apply. 
,' 
As a general rule the accident or mistake 
authorizing relief [from a default judgment] 
may not be predicated upon the neglect of 
the party's attorney unless shown to be ex-
cusable • • • because the negligence of the 
attorney • • • is imputed to his client and 
may not be offered by the latter as a basis 
for relief. • • • The exception is premised 
upon the concept the attorney's conduct, in 
effect, obliterates the existence of the at-
torney-client relationship and for this rea-
son his negligence should not be imputed to 
the client. Id. at 63-64. 
The court in Buckert stressed that the attorney acted and spoke 
as though there were no attorney-client relationship between 
him and the defaulting parties. Id. at 64. 
The Buckert rule is irrelevant to this case. Although 
Swapp's original attorney failed to protect his client's inter-
ests, he never indicated that he did not represent Swapp. In 
fact, he filed answers to the Complaint and Cross-Claim, and 
entered stipulations concerning the timing of responses to 
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discovery requests. He acted as Swapp' s attorney even though 
he may have done so inadequately. Buckert adds nothing to 
Swapp's arg~ment on this appeal. 
In St. Vrain Development Co. v. F & S Development Co., 
470 P. 49 (Colo. App. 1970), which Swapp also cites, the Court 
held that the trial court acted within its discretion in vacat-
ing a default which resulted from the negligence of the de-
faulting party's attorney. Such a holding merely illustrates 
the wide scope appellate courts typically give a trial court's 
decision on a motion to set aside a default. St. Vrain may be 
authority for the proposition that the trial court could have 
granted Swapp' s motion, but "this court will not reverse the 
determination of the trial court mainly because the motion 
could have been granted." 
Parker, 513 P.2d at 431. 
Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. 
Finally, Swapp relies on Treadway v. Meador, 103 Ariz. 
83, 436 P.2d 902 (1968), and Coerber v. Rath, 164 Colo. 294, 
435 P.2d 228 {1968). In the former case a default was entered 
against Mr. and Mrs. 
assured them that he 
Treadway. They retained counse 1, who 
would answer certain Interrogatories. 
When the Interrogatories were not answered, a default was 
entered. The court held that the Treadways should not be 
subject to default for relying on such assurances. Similarly, 
in Coerber v. Rath, the Coerbers requested and received 
-16-
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assurances from their attorney that he was properly taking care 
of their case. Swapp by contrast makes no allegation whatso-
ever that he ever sought to determine the status of this case. 
Unlike appellants in Treadway and Coeber, Swapp was guilty of 
negligence on his own account in failing to maintain contact 
with his attorney. 
CONCLUSION 
There is nothing that sets this case apart from most 
other cases resulting in default. Swapp failed to respond to a 
discovery request even after a motion to compel, and the trial 
court entered a default and refused to set it aside. Its deci-
sion is entitled to deference on appeal. This court cannot 
overturn that decision without destroying the finality of all 
default judgments. Any defaulting party that can convincingly 
blame the default on its attorney has the same claim for relief 
that Swapp puts forward. Swapp should seek relief from the 
affect of the default judgment by suing his former attorney. 
This Court should affirm the Order of the Third Judi-
cial District Court upholding the default and award costs on 
this appeal against Crossclaimant-appellant Reid Swapp. 
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